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Abstract— This paper studies a system of linear equations,
denoted as Ax = b, which is horizontally partitioned (rows in
A and b) and stored over a network of m devices connected in
a fixed directed graph. We design a fast distributed algorithm
for solving such a partitioned system of linear equations, that
additionally, protects the privacy of local data against an honest-
but-curious adversary that corrupts at most τ nodes in the
network. First, we present TITAN, privaTe fInite Time Average
coNsensus algorithm, for solving a general average consen-
sus problem over directed graphs, while protecting statistical
privacy of private local data against an honest-but-curious
adversary. Second, we propose a distributed linear system solver
that involves each agent/devices computing an update based
on local private data, followed by private aggregation using
TITAN. Finally, we show convergence of our solver to the least
squares solution in finite rounds along with statistical privacy of
local linear equations against an honest-but-curious adversary
provided the graph has weak vertex-connectivity of at least
τ+1. We perform numerical experiments to validate our claims
and compare our solution to the state-of-the-art methods by
comparing computation, communication and memory costs.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider a system of linear equations,
Ax = b, (1)
where, x ∈ Rn is the n−dimensional solution to be learned,
and A ∈ Rp×n, b ∈ Rp×1 encode p linear equations in
n−variables. The system of linear equations is horizontally
partitioned and stored over a network of m devices. Each
device i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} has access to pi linear equations
denoted by,
Aix = bi, (2)
where, Ai ∈ Rpi×n and bi ∈ Rpi×1. For instance, in
Fig. 1 we show a network of m = 5 nodes and horizontal
partitioning of p = 15 linear equations in n = 5 variables
using colored blocks. In this paper, we consider an honest-
but-curious adversary that corrupts at most τ devices/nodes
in the network and exploits observed information to infer
private data. We are interested in designing a fast, distributed
algorithm that solves problem (1), while, protecting privacy
of local information (Ai, bi) against such an honest-but-
curious adversary.
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Fig. 1: Directed network with m = 5 nodes and 1 adversary.
A and b are horizontally partitioned and stored at m nodes.
Local information is private to the nodes.
Solving a system of linear algebraic equations is a fun-
damental problem that is central to analysis of electri-
cal networks, sensor networking, supply chain management
and filtering [1]–[3]. Several of these applications involve
linear equations being stored at geographically separated
devices/agents that are connected via a communication
network. The geographic separation between agents along
with communication constraints and unavailability of central
servers necessitates design of distributed algorithms. Re-
cently, several articles have proposed distributed algorithms
for solving (1), [4]–[10] to name a few. In this work, we
specifically focus on designing private methods that protect
sensitive and private linear equations at each device/agent.
Literature has explored several approaches to solving
a distributed system of linear equations. Authors in [2]
formulated the problem as a parameter estimation task.
Consensus or gossip based distributed estimation algorithms
are then used to solve (1). Interleaved consensus and local
projection based methods are explored in [4]–[6]. These
direct methods, involving feasilble iterates that move only
along the null space of local coefficient matrix Ai, converge
exponentially fast. One can also view solving (1) as a
constrained consensus [11] problem, where agents attempt
to agree to a variable x such that local equations at each
agent are satisfied. Problem (1) can also be formulated as a
convex optimization problem, specifically linear regression,
and solved using plethora of distributed optimization meth-
ods as explored in [7]. Authors augment their optimization
based algorithms with a finite-time decentralized consensus
scheme to achieve finite-time convergence of iterates to the
solution. In comparison, our approach is not incremental and
only needs two steps – (a) computing local updates, followed
by, (b) fast aggregation and exact solution computation. Our
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algorithm converges to the unique least squares solution in
finite-time and additionally guarantees information-theoretic
privacy of local data/equations (Ai, bi).
Few algorithms focus on privacy of local equations
(Ai, bi). In this paper, we design algorithms with provable
privacy properties. One can leverage vast private optimization
literature by reformulating problem (1) as a least-squares
regression problem and use privacy preserving optimization
algorithms [12]–[17] on the resulting strongly convex cost
function. Differential privacy is employed in [14], [17] for
distributed convex optimization, however, it suffers from a
fundamental privacy - accuracy trade-off [16]. Authors in
[15], [18] use partially homomorphic encryption for privacy.
However, these methods incur high computational costs and
unsuitable for high dimensional problems. Secure Multi-
party Computation (SMC) based method for privately solving
system of linear equations is proposed in [19], however,
this solution requires a central Crypto System Provider for
generating garbled circuits. In this work, we design a purely
distributed solution. Liu et al. propose a private linear system
solver in [20], [21], however, as we discuss in Section IV-A,
our algorithm is faster, requiring fewer iterations. Our prior
work [12], [13] proposes non-identifiability over equivalent
problems as a privacy definition and algorithms to achieve
it. It admits privacy and accuracy guarantees simultaneously,
however, it uses a weaker adversary model that does not
know distribution of noise/perturbations used by agents.
In this paper, we consider a stronger definition of privacy
viz. statistical privacy from [22], [23]. This definition of pri-
vacy allows for a stronger adversary that knows distribution
of random numbers used by agents and has unbounded com-
putational capabilities. We call this definition information-
theoretic because additional observations do not lead to
incremental improvement of adversarial knowledge about
private data. Algorithms in [22], [23] provide algorithms for
private average consensus over undirected graphs. We gen-
eralize their work to solve the problem over directed graphs
and show a superior finite-time convergence guarantee.
Our Contributions:
Algorithm: We present an algorithm, TITAN (privaTe fInite
Time Average coNsensus), that solves average consensus
problem over directed graphs in finite-time, while protecting
statistical privacy of private inputs. It involves a distributed
Obfuscation Step to hide private inputs, followed by a
distributed recovery algorithm to collect all perturbed inputs
at each node. Agents then compute exact average/aggregate
using the recovered perturbed inputs. We further leverage
TITAN to solve Problem (1) in finite time with strong
statistical privacy guarantees.
Convergence Results: We show that TITAN converges to the
exact average in finite time that depends only on the number
of nodes and graph diameter. We show that graph being
strongly connected is sufficient for convergence. Moreover,
algorithm needs to know only an an upper bound on the
number of nodes and graph diameter. We do not require
out-degree of nodes to be known, a limitation commonly
observed in push-sum type methods [24], for solving av-
erage consensus over directed graphs. TITAN based solver
converges to the unique least squares solution of (1) in finite
time.
Privacy Results: We show that TITAN provides statistical
privacy of local inputs as long as weak vertex connectivity of
communication graph is at least t+1. This condition is also
necessary and hence tight. Our privacy guarantee implies that
for any two problems (1) characterized by (A, b) and (A′, b′),
such that rows of (A, b) and (A′, b′) stored at corrupted
nodes are same and least squares solution for both systems is
identical, the distribution of observations by the adversary is
same. This equivalently entails adversary learning very little
(statistically) in addition to the solution.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider a group of m agents/nodes connected in a
directed network. We model the directed communication
network as a directed graph G = (V, E), where, V =
{1, 2, . . . ,m} denotes the set of nodes and E denote reliable,
loss-less, synchronous and directed communication links.
Recall, we are interested in solving a system of linear
equations, problem (1), that is horizontally partitioned and
stored at m agents. Each agent i has access to private pi
linear equations in n variables denoted by (2). Equivalently
our problem formulation states that each agent i has access
to private data matrices (Ai, bi) that characterize (2). In this
work, we assume that our system of linear equations in (1)
admits a unique least squares solution, i.e. ATA matrix is
full rank. If an exact solution for (1) exists, then it matches
the least squares solution. Let ls-sol(A, b) denote the unique
least squares solution of Ax = b. We wish to compute x∗ ,
ls-sol(A, b) that solves the collective system Ax = b, while,
protecting privacy of local data (Ai, bi). Next, we discuss the
adversary model, privacy definition and few preliminaries.
A. Adversary Model and Privacy Definition
We consider an honest-but-curious adversary, that follows
the prescribed protocol, however, is interested in learning
private information from other agents. The adversary can
corrupt at most τ nodes and has access to all the information
stored, processed and received by the corrupted nodes. Let us
denote the corrupted nodes as A. We assume the adversary
and corrupted nodes have unbounded storage and computa-
tional capabilities.
The coefficients of linear equations encode private and
sensitive information. In the context of robotic or sensor
networks, the coefficients of linear equations conceal sensor
observations and measurements – information private to
agents. In the context of supply chain management and
logistics, linear equations are used to optimize transport of
raw-materials, and the coefficients of linear equations often
leak business sensitive information about quantity and type
of raw-materials/products being transported by a company.
Mathematically, adversary seeks to learn local coefficient
matrices (Ai, bi) corresponding to any non-corrupt agent i.
Privacy requires that the observations made by the adver-
sary do not leak significant information about the private
inputs. We use the definition of information-theoretic or
statistical privacy from [22], [23]. Let ViewA((A, b)) be the
random variable denoting the observations made by set of
adversarial nodes A given private inputs (A, b). We formally
define statistical privacy (from [22], [23]) as follows.
Definition 1. A distributed protocol is A-private if for all
(A, b) and (A′, b′), such that A[i, :] = A′[i, :], b[i] = b′[i] for
all i ∈ A, and ls-sol(A, b) = ls-sol(A′, b′), the distributions
of ViewA((A, b)) and ViewA((A′, b′)) are identical.
Intuitively, for all systems of equations (A′, b′), such that
linear equations stored at A are the same and ls-sol(A, b) =
ls-sol(A′, b′), observations made by the adversary will have
the same distribution, making them statistically indistinguish-
able from adversary A.
More, generally as discussed in [22], [23] for average
consensus over private inputs {xi}mi=1, an algorithm is
A−private, if for all inputs {xi}mi=1 and {x′i}mi=1, such
that xi = x′i for all i ∈ A and
∑m
i=1 xi =
∑m
i=1 x
′
i,
the distributions of information observed by adversary is
the same. In other words, probability density function of
ViewA({xi}mi=1) and ViewA({x′i}mi=1) are same.
B. Notation and Preliminaries
For each node i ∈ V , we define in-neighbor set, N ini ,
as the set of all nodes that send information to node i; and
out-neighbor set, N outi , as the set of all nodes that receive
information from node i. Let δ(G) denote the diameter of
graph G, and B denote the incidence matrix of graph G. Let
{⊥}m denote a m−dimensional empty vector. Let U [a, b) be
uniform distribution over [a, b).
Modular arithmetic, typically defined over a finite field of
integers, involves numbers wrapping around when reaching
a certain value. In this work, we use real numbers and define
an extension of modular arithmetic over reals:
Definition 2. Consider a real interval [0, a) ∈ R. We
define mod(x, a) ∈ [0, a) as the remainder obtained when
x is divided by a and the quotient is an integer. That is,
mod(x, a) = x− pa where p is the unique integer such that
mod(x, a) ∈ [0, a).
Modulo operator satisfies useful properties as detailed below.
The proofs are easy and omitted for brevity.
Remark 1. Modular arithmetic over reals satisfies following
properties for all real numbers {yi}i and integer q.
1) mod(
∑q
i=1 yi, a) = mod(
∑q
i=1mod(yi, a), a),
2) mod(−yi, a) = a−mod(yi, a).
III. TITAN - PRIVATE AVERAGE CONSENSUS
In this section, we develop TITAN, an algorithm for solv-
ing distributed average consensus with provable statistical
privacy and finite-time convergence. In Section IV, we will
use TITAN to solve Problem (1) with statistical privacy of
local data (Ai, bi) and finite-time convergence to x∗.
Consider a simple average consensus problem over m
agents connected using directed graph G. Each node i ∈ V
has access to private input xi ∈ [0, a). The objective is to
compute average (1/m)
∑m
i=1 xi, while, protecting statistical
privacy of inputs xi (see Section II-A).
TITAN involves an obfuscation step to hide private infor-
mation and generate obfuscated inputs. This is followed by
several rounds of Top-k consensus primitive for distributed
recovery of perturbed inputs. Consequently, we exploit mod-
ulo aggregate invariance property of the obfuscation step and
locally process perturbed inputs to arrive at desired average.
The obfuscation step guarantees statistical privacy of inputs,
while, the distributed recover and local computation of
average are key to finite-time convergence of the algorithm.
We detail each of the steps below.
Obfuscation Step
The obfuscation step is a distributed method to generate
network correlated noise that vanishes under modulo oper-
ation over the aggregate. First, each node i sends uniform
random noise rij ∼ U [0,ma) to out-neighbors N outi and re-
ceives rli from in-neighbors l ∈ N ini (Line 2, Algorithm 1).
Next, each agent i computes perturbation ti using (3)
(Line 3, Algorithm 1). Observe that due to the modulo
operation, each perturbation ti satisfies ti ∈ [0,ma).
Finally, agent i adds perturbation ti to its private value
xi and performs a modulo operation about ma to get the
perturbed input, x˜i, as seen in (4). Observe that x˜i ∈ [0,ma).
We now show the modulo aggregate invariance property
of the obfuscation mechanism described above. Notice that
each noise rij is added by node j to get tj (before modulo
Algorithm 1: TITAN({xi}mi=1, T, k,m)
Input: {xi}mi=1, where, xi ∈ [0, a) ∀i ∈ V , T , k
Output: x = (1/m)
∑m
i=1 xi
1 Initialization Node i initializes ri = {⊥}m
Obfuscation Step
2 Node i sends random numbers rij ∼ U [0,ma) to each
out-neighbor j ∈ N outi
3 Node i constructs perturbation ti,
ti = mod
 ∑
j∈N ini
rji −
∑
j∈Nouti
rij ,ma
 (3)
4 Each node i perturbs private input,
x˜i = mod(xi + ti,ma). (4)
Distributed Recovery using Top-k Primitive
5 Each node i ∈ V runs Top-k primitive dm/ke times
6 for t = 0, 1, . . . , dm/ke − 1 do
7 (ri[tk + 1 : (t+ 1)k], Ii[tk + 1 : (t+ 1)k]) =
Top-k (({xi}mi=1 \ ri[1 : tk], {i}mi=1 \ Ii[1 : tk]), T )
8 end
9 Return x = (1/m)mod(
∑m
l=1 ri[l],ma).
operation) and subtracted by node i to get ti (before modulo
operation). This gives us,
mod
(
m∑
i=1
ti,ma
)
(a)
= mod
 m∑
i=1
mod
 ∑
j∈N ini
rji −
∑
j∈Nouti
rij ,ma
 ,ma

(b)
= mod
 m∑
i=1
 ∑
j∈N ini
rji −
∑
j∈Nouti
rij
 ,ma

(c)
= mod(0,ma) = 0. (5)
In the above expression, (a) follows from definition of ti in
(3), (b) follows from property 1 in Remark 1, and (c) is a
consequence of perturbation design in (3). We call this as
modulo aggregate invariance of the obfuscation step.
Distributed Recovery via Top-k Consensus Primitive
We perform distributed recovery of perturbed inputs, that
is, we run a distributed algorithm to “gather” all perturbed
inputs ({x˜i}mi=1) at each node. After the completion of this
step, each node i will have access to the entire set of
perturbed inputs {x˜i}mi=1. Top-k consensus primitive is a
method to perform distributed recovery.
The Top-k consensus primitive is a distributed protocol
for all nodes to agree on the largest k inputs in the network.
In TITAN, we run the Top-k consensus primitive and store
the resulting list of top-k perturbed inputs. We then run
Top-k primitive again while excluding the perturbed inputs
recovered from prior iterations. Executing Top-k consensus
primitive successively dm/ke times leads us to the list of all
perturbed inputs in the network (Lines 5-8, Algorithm 1).
Top-k Consensus Primitive: Recall, each node i has access
to a perturbed input x˜i and an unique identifier i. The Top-k
consensus is a consensus protocol for nodes to agree over
k largest input values and associated node id’s with ties
going to nodes with larger id. Formally, the algorithm results
in each node agreeing on {(x(1), . . . , x(k)), (i(1), . . . , i(k))},
where, x(1) ≥ . . . ≥ x(k) ≥ x(k+1) ≥ . . . ≥ x(m) is the
ordering of private inputs {xj}mj=1 and i(k) denote the ids
corresponding to x(k) for each k. Ties go to nodes with larger
id, implying, if x(j) = x(j+1) then i(j) > i(j+1).
Each node i stores an estimate of k largest inputs and their
id’s denoted by Li and `i respectively. These vectors, Li and
`i, are initialized with local private input and own agent id
respectively (Line 1, Algorithm 2).
At each iteration r = 1, . . . , T , agent i share their
estimates Li and `i to out-neighbors and receives Lj and
`j from in-neighbors j ∈ N ini (Line 3, Algorithm 2). Agent
i sets L+i equal to the k largest values of available inputs,
that is Li and ∪j∈N ini Lj ; and sets `
+
i as id’s corresponding
to the entries in L+i (Lines 5,6, Algorithm 2). In case of ties,
that is several agents having the same input, the tie goes to
agent with larger id. Next, agents update the local estimate of
top k entries as Li = L+i and `i = `
+
i (Line 8, Algorithm 2).
Algorithm 2: Top-k consensus: Top-k({(xi, i)}mi=1,T )
Input: {(xi, i)}mi=1, T , k
Output: {(x(1), . . . , x(k)), (i(1), . . . , i(k))}
1 Initialization Node i initializes two k dimensional
vectors Li = {xi,⊥, . . . ,⊥} & `i = {i,⊥, . . . ,⊥}
2 for t = 1, . . . , T do
3 Node i sends Li & `i to out-neighbors N outi
Each node i ∈ V performs:
4 for r = 1, . . . , k do
5 L+i [r] = max(Li ∪j∈N ini Lj \ (∪
r−1
s=1L
+
i [s]))
6 `+i [r] = id corresponding to Li[r]
7 . . . Ties go to node with larger id
8 Li = L
+
i and `i = `
+
i
9 end
10 end
11 Return {Li, `i} → {(x(1), . . . , x(k)), (i(1), . . . , i(k))}
This process of selection of largest perturbed input and
it’s id is repeated T times. As stated in Theorem 1, each
Li and `i converge to the Top-k values and associated id’s
respectively provided that T ≥ δ(G), the graph diameter.
Recall, that running Top-k consensus primitive dm/ke
times, successively, allows each node to recover perturbed
inputs {x˜i}mi=1. Agents then add the perturbed inputs re-
covered by Top-k consensus algorithm and exploit modulo
aggregate invariance property of obfuscation step to exactly
compute, x = (1/m)mod(
∑m
l=1 ri[l],ma).
A. Results and Discussion
Correctness Guarantee: We first begin by a correctness result
for the Top-k consensus primitive. It is a consequence of
convergence of max consensus over directed graphs.
Theorem 1 (Correctness of Top-k). If G is a strongly
connected graph with diameter δ(G) and T ≥ δ(G), then
Li = Lj = {x(1), . . . , x(k)}, `i = `j = {I(1), . . . , I(k)}, for
each i, j ∈ V , for the Top-k consensus algorithm.
The result establishes a lower bound on parameter T for
correctness of Top-k consensus primitive. If δ(G) is not
exactly known, we can set T to be any upper bound on
δ(G), without worrying about correctness.
The ability of Top-k protocol to recover k largest perturbed
inputs leads us to the correctness guarantee for TITAN. As
a consequence of Theorem 1, we can conclude that dm/ke
successive execution of Top-k primitive over perturbed inputs
leads to recovery of all perturbed inputs at each node.
Moreover, we use the aggregate invariant property of the
obfuscation step, implying for all graphs G,
mod
(
m∑
i=1
x˜i,ma
)
=
m∑
i=1
xi. (6)
We prove this in Section VI. Consequently, perturbed inputs
allows us to compute the correct aggregate and average. The
following result formally states this result:
Theorem 2 (Correctness of TITAN). If G is strongly con-
nected and T ≥ δ(G), then TITAN (Algorithm 1) converges
to the exact average of inputs x = 1m
∑m
i=1 xi in finite time
given by T dm/ke.
Note, for finite-time convergence, we only need G to be
strongly connected. The time required for convergence is
dependent only on the number of agents m 1, parameter T
(an upper bound on graph diameter δ(G)) and parameter k.
Privacy Guarantee: The privacy guarantee is a consequence
of the obfuscation step used in TITAN. Let G = (V, E) be the
undirected version of G. More specifically, G has the same
vertex set V = V but the edge set E is obtained by taking all
the edges in E and augmenting it with the reversed edges.
Consequently, G is undirected. We define weak vertex-
connectivity of a directed graph G as the vertex-connectivity
of its undirected variant G. Weak vertex-connectivity of G
is κ(G), where, κ denotes the vertex-connectivity. We show
that provided the weak vertex-connectivity of G is at least
τ + 1, TITAN preserves statistical privacy of input.
Theorem 3. If weak vertex-connectivity κ(G) ≥ τ +1, then
TITAN is A-private against any set of adversaries A such
that |A| ≤ τ .
Note, we require G to be both strongly connected and pos-
sess weak vertex-connectivity of at least τ +1 for achieving
both finite-time correctness and statistical privacy guarantees.
Moreover, the weak vertex-connectivity condition is also
necessary and can be showed by contradiction, similar to
Proof of Theorem 2 in [25]. Consequently, the weak vertex-
connectivity condition is tight.
Memory Costs: Top-k primitive requires each node to main-
tain vectors Li and `i in addition to recovered pertrubed
inputs. Overall the memory required per node is (2k+m)d
units, where, d is the dimension of input xi. This is larger as
compared to standard average consensus methods and ratio
consensus methods that require d and 2d units respectively.
Observe the trade-off between Memory Overhead and Con-
vergence Time. As k increases from 1 to m, the convergence
time decreases from Tm to T , while the memory overhead
(per node) increases from (2 +m)d to 3md.
Communication Costs: The obfuscation step requires node
i to send |N outi |d messages. Moreover, Top-k algorithm
involves exchange of Li and `i by each node. This
additionally requires 2k|N outi |T dm/ked messages in to-
tal. Together, the communication overhead for node i is
|N outi | (2kT dm/ke+ 1) d. Total communication cost (per
node) is largely independent of k, as total information
exchanged over entire execution does not change with k.
1If agents know only an upper bound on m˜ ≥ m, then we can run
TITAN on inputs xi = 1 for each i ∈ V while using m˜ instead of m and
a = 2. Finally, by computing mod(
∑
i x˜i, m˜a) we recover m exactly.
Comparison with FAIM: Oliva et al. propose FAIM, finite-
time average-consensus by iterated max-consensus, in [26].
TITAN has several similarities with FAIM and we can recover
a statistically private version of FAIM by setting k = 1. Our
work, in addition to finite-time average consensus, is directed
toward provably privacy of local information.
IV. PRIVATE SOLVER FOR SYSTEM OF LINEAR
EQUATIONS
In this section, we develop a solver (Algorithm 3) employ-
ing TITAN to privately solve problem (1).
The least squares solution to system of linear equations
(1) can be expressed in closed form as, (ATA)−1AT b. If an
exact solution to (1) exists then the least squares solution
matches it. Moreover, as the equations are horizontally
partitioned, we can rewrite,
ATA =
m∑
i=1
ATi Ai A
T b =
m∑
i=1
ATi bi. (7)
Consequently, solution to system of linear equations can
be computed by privately aggregating ATi Ai and A
T
i bi
separately over the network and computing,
x∗ =
(
m∑
i=1
ATi Ai
)−1( m∑
i=1
ATi bi
)
. (8)
Privately computing x∗ is equivalent to agents privately
aggregating ATi Ai and A
T
i bi over the directed network
followed by locally computing x∗ using Eq. (8).
We assume, w.l.o.g, that each entry in matrix local updates
ATi Ai and A
T
i bi lies in [0, a), where, a > largest entry in
matrices ATi Ai and A
T
i bi. If this is not satisfied, we can add
the same constant to each entry in the matrix and subtract
it after computing aggregate. Next, in Algorithm 3, we run
TITAN on each entry of matrices {ATi Ai}mi=1 to get update
matrix X , run TITAN on each entry of vector {ATi bi}mi=1 to
get update vector Y . We select T ≥ δ(G) and a parameter
k ≤ m following the discussion in Section III-A. As a
consequence of Theorem 2, the algorithms terminate in finite
time and X = 1m
∑m
i=1A
T
i Ai and Y =
1
m
∑m
i=1A
T
i bi.
Finally, we use (8) to compute the least squares solution.
Algorithm 3: Private Solver for Problem (1)
Input: {ATi Ai, ATi bi}mi=1 and
a > the largest entry of [ATi Ai A
T
i bi] over all
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}
Output: x∗
Run TITAN over each entry of ATi Ai and A
T
i bi
1 Compute: X = TITAN({ATi Ai}mi=1, T, k,m)
2 Compute: Y = TITAN({ATi bi}mi=1, T, k,m)
3 Return x∗ = (mX)−1(mY ).
A. Results and Discussion
Correctness and Privacy: Our solution (Algorithm 3) in-
volves using TITAN on each entry of matrices, ATi Ai and
ATi bi. As a consequence of Theorem 2, we know that
provided G is strongly connected and parameter T ≥ δ(G),
we get accurate estimate of
∑m
i=1A
T
i Ai and
∑m
i=1A
T
i bi in
finite time. Using (8), we compute solution x∗, and as a
result we have solved (1) accurately in finite time. From
Theorem 3, provided κ(G) ≥ τ + 1, TITAN preserves the
statistical privacy of local inputs (ATi Ai, A
T
i bi), equivalently
preserves the statistical privacy of (Ai, bi), against any
adversary that corrupts A subject to |A| ≤ τ .
Comparison with Relevant Literature: Liu et al. propose a
privacy mechanism, an alternative to the obfuscation mech-
anism in TITAN, and augment it to gossip algorithms for
privately solving average consensus. This private average
consensus is used along with direct method [4] to arrive at
a private linear system solver. However, it requires agents
to reach complete consensus between successive direct pro-
jection based steps. This increases the number of iterations
needed to solve the problem and significantly increases
communication costs as the underlying method [4] is only
linearly convergent. Distributed Recovery phase in TITAN
also requires complete consensus, but we do it in finite time
using Top-k primitive, and it is only performed once.
Authors in [7] propose a finite-time solver for solving
(1). However, under this protocol an arbitrarily chosen
node/agent observes states for all nodes, and the observations
are used compute the exact solution. This algorithm was not
designed to protect privacy of local information and conse-
quently leads to large privacy violations by the arbitrarily
chosen node. Algorithm 3 solves (1) in finite time, while
additionally protecting statistical privacy of local equations.
Moreover, the algorithm in [7] is computationally expensive
– requiring matrix singularity checks and kernel space com-
putation. In comparison, our algorithm is inexpensive and
the most expensive step is matrix inversion in (8), that needs
to be performed only once.
Direct methods [4], [6], constrained consensus applied
to linear systems [11] and distributed optimization methods
applied to linear regression [27]–[29] are only linearly con-
vergent, while, we provide superior finite-time convergence
guarantee.
Finite-time convergence of underlying consensus is critical
for statistically private mechanisms such as the one in
TITAN and the algorithms from [22], [23]. These mechanisms
rely on modulo arithmetic, if we add them to a linearly
convergent solver which outputs in-exact average/aggregate,
then performing modulo operation over the in-exact output,
in final step, may arbitrarily amplify errors.
Improving Computational Efficiency: In our approach, each
node needs to compute an inverse,
(∑m
i=1A
T
i Ai
)−1
, which
takes O(n3) computations. Note, this inverse is not per-
formed on private data. We can reduce computational cost
by allowing one node to perform the inversion followed
by transmitting the solution to all nodes either by flooding
Fig. 2: Inputs xi = ATi Ai and yi = A
T
i bi for i ∈ V and
perturbed inputs x˜i and y˜i. The perturbed inputs appear to
be random and very different from the private inputs.
protocol or sending it over a spanning-tree of G.
V. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we perform two numerical experiments to
validate Algorithm 3. First, we conduct a simple simulation
over the problem defined in Fig. 1 and show that update
matrices ATi Ai observed by the adversary appear to be
random (Lemma 2). Second, we run a large scale experiment
with synthetic data, with m = 100, p = 10000 and n = 100.
We have m = 5 nodes, with p = 15 linear equations
in n = 5 variables being stored on the 5 nodes (3 each)
as shown in Fig. 1. We generated A and b matrices by
drawing their entries from a Gaussian distribution (mean
= 0 and variance = 2) and verified ATA is full rank. We
executed Algorithm 3 at each node. We select parameter
T = m ≥ δ(G) = 4, k = m = 5, and a = 20. The algorithm
solves the problem exactly in T = 6 iterations. Note G is
strongly connected and has a weak vertex-connectivity of
2. Consequently, both accuracy and statistical privacy are
guaranteed by Theorems 2, 3. The perturbed update matrices
generated after obfuscation step in TITAN are received by
adversary node 1 and shown in Fig. 2. The color of each
entry in the matrix represents its numerical value and Fig. 2
shows that the perturbed updates are starkly different from
private updates and appear random.
Consider a large scale system with m = 100 agents
and p = 10000 equations in n = 100 variables that are
horizontally partitioned for each agent to have pi = 100
equations (∀i ∈ V). The coefficients of the linear equations
are synthetically generated via a Gaussian process and admit
a unique least squares solution. The graph G is a directed
ring with graph diameter δ(G) = m−1 = 99 and κ(G) = 2.
We run Algorithm 3 with parameters T = m ≥ δ(G)
and k = 10. We consider an honest-but-curious adversary
that corrupts at most one agent and from κ(G) = 2
we guarantee statistical privacy of local data (Ai, bi). The
algorithm converges to the solution in 1000 iterations.
VI. ANALYSIS AND PROOFS
A. Convergence Analysis
We first prove correctness of Top-k consensus primitive.
Proof of Theorem 1. In the Top-k consensus algorithm, each
agent/node tries to keep track of the largest k inputs observed
till then. As T ≥ δ(G), each one of the k largest inputs,
i.e., x(1), . . . , x(k), reaches each node in the network. Con-
sequently, each nodes’ local states Li and `i converge to the
k largest inputs in the network and associated id’s.
Next, we prove correctness of TITAN in finite-time.
Proof of Theorem 2. The correctness result in Theorem 2
follows from two key statements: (1) TITAN output is exactly
equal to x = (1/m)
∑m
i=1 xi, and (2) TITAN converges in
finite time. We prove both the statements above.
(1) Recall that TITAN outputs (1/m)mod(
∑
i x˜
m
i=1,ma). We
use properties of modulo function to get,
mod(
∑
i
x˜mi=1,ma) = mod(
m∑
i=1
mod(xi + ti,ma),ma)
(a)
= mod(
m∑
i=1
(xi + ti),ma)
(b)
= mod(
m∑
i=1
xi,ma) =
m∑
i=1
xi.
(9)
Recall, (a) follows from Remark 1, (b) follows from∑m
i=1 ti = 0, and final equality follows from xi ∈ [0, a),∑m
i=1 xi ∈ [0,ma) and Definition 2. We have proved TITAN
computes the exact aggregate and consequently the average.
(2) The Top-k protocol involves T = δ˜ ≥ δ(G) iterations
where nodes share the largest k values that they have
encountered. From Theorem 1, Top-k converges to the largest
k perturbed inputs. We need to run dm/ke iterations of Top-
k consensus. Consequently, the total iterations for complete
execution is T dm/ke.
B. Privacy Analysis
The privacy analysis presented here is similar in structure
to [22], [23]. The key difference lies in the graph condition
required for privacy. Recall G is augmented G. Specifically,
G has the same vertex set V but the edge set E is obtained by
taking all edges in E and augmenting it with reversed edges.
Recall, the noise shared on edge e = (i, j) ∈ E , is denoted as
rij and it is uniformly distributed over [0,ma). Perturbations
ti constructed using (3) can be written as t = mod(Br,ma),
where B is the incidence matrix of G and r is the vector of
rij ordered according to the edge ordering in columns of B.
If G is strongly connected then G is weakly connected and
G is connected.
Lemma 1. If G is connected then t is uniformly dis-
tributed over all points in [0,ma)m subject to the constraint
mod(
∑m
i=1 ti,ma) = 0.
Proof. Recall that perturbation vector t = [ti] can be written
as t = mod(
∑|E|
j=1Brj ,ma), where the modulo operation
is performed element-wise.
The connectivity of G ensures that each ti is a linear
combination of uniform random perturbations (rj’s). We use
the fact that mod(a+ b) is uniformly distributed if either a
or b is uniformly distributed. Using above statements along
with rj ∼ U [0,ma) we get ti ∼ U [0,ma). t is uniformly
distributed over [0,ma)m. Moreover, from (5), we know,
mod(1T t,ma) = 0, is guaranteed if t = mod(Br,ma).
This completes the proof of Lemma 1.
Using the above property of perturbations, t, we can show
that perturbed inputs appear to be uniformly random, as
described in the next lemma.
Lemma 2. If G is connected then the effective inputs x˜i are
uniformly distributed over [0,ma) subject to the constraint
mod(
∑m
i=1 x˜i,ma) =
∑
i xi.
Proof. Let X˜,X and T represent the random vectors of
agents obfuscated inputs, private inputs and perturbations
respectively. Let fX˜ , fX and fT denote the probability
distribution of the respective random variables.
Recall x˜i = mod(xi + ti) and the fact that ti and xi are
independent. We have,
fX˜(x˜|X = x) = fT (T = mod(x˜− x))
As G is connected and mod(
∑m
i=1 x˜i) =
∑m
i=1 xi from
(9), we know that mod(x˜− x) is uniformly distributed over
[0,ma)m. And we have fT (T = mod(x˜ − x)) = constant
for any x˜ ∈ [0,ma)m, given mod(1T x˜) = 1Tx.
We have that fX˜(x˜|X = x) = constant for all x˜ ∈ [0,ma)m
implying that the perturbed input appears to be uniformly
distributed over [0,ma)m subject to mod(1T x˜) = 1Tx.
Recall, A is the set of honest-but-curious adversaries with
|A| ≤ τ . Also recall, adversarial nodes observe/store all
information directly received and transmitted.
Proof of Theorem 3. Let H = V\A denote the set of honest
nodes. Let GH = (H, EH) denote the subgraph induced by
honest nodes, implying, EH ⊆ E is the set of all edges from
G that are incident on & from two honest nodes. Let BH
denote the oriented incidence matrix of graph GH.
We know that vertex connectivity κ(G) ≥ τ+1, implying
that deleting any τ nodes from G does not disconnect it.
Implying, GH is connected.
The information accessible to an adversary, defined as
ViewA, consists of the private inputs of corrupted agents,
perturbed inputs of honest agents and the random numbers
transmitted or received by corrupted nodes.
ViewA(x) = {{x˜i|i ∈ H}, {xi|i ∈ A}, {rij |i ∈ A or j ∈ A}}
For privacy, we prove that the probability distributions of
ViewA(x) = ViewA(x′) for any two inputs x, x′ such that
xi = x
′
i for all i ∈ A and
∑
i∈V xi =
∑
i∈V x
′
i.
Let the incidence matrix be partitioned as B = [BH BA],
where BH are columns of B corresponding to edges in EH
and BA are columns of B corresponding to edges in EA =
E \ EH. Let Be represent the eth column of B and Bi,e rep-
resent the [i, e]th entry of matrix B. re denote the eth entry
of vector r. Note that the perturbations can be expressed as,
ti = mod
(∑
e∈EH∪EA Bi,ere,ma
)
and equivalently as ti =
mod(tHi +t
A
i ,ma), where, t
H
i = mod
(∑
e∈EH Bi,ere,ma
)
and tAi = mod
(∑
e∈EA Bi,ere,ma
)
, following Remark 1.
Using Lemma 1 we can state the following. The val-
ues {tHi }i∈H = {mod(
∑
e∈EH Bi,ere,ma)}i∈H lies in the
span of columns of BH and is uniformly distributed over
[0,ma)|H| subject to
∑
i∈Hmod(
∑
e∈EH Bi,ere,ma) =
0 given that GH is connected. Consequently, the masks
{ti}i∈H are uniformly distributed over [0,ma)|H| subject to
mod(
∑
i∈H ti,ma) = −mod(
∑
i∈A ti,ma), given GH is
connected, and given perturbations {re}e∈EA .
Recall, re∈EH are uniformly and independently distributed
in [0,ma) given values of {re}e∈EA and ti for each i ∈ A.
We use the fact that GH is connected and Lemma 2, we
get that, x˜i are uniformly distributed over [0,ma) subject to
mod(
∑
i x˜i,ma) =
∑
i xi. Thus, if XH, X˜H are random
variables representing {xi}i∈H and {x˜i}i∈H, then,
fX˜H(x˜H|xH, {re}e∈EA) = constant
for all x˜H in [0,ma)|H| that satisfy, mod(
∑
i∈H x˜i,ma) =
mod(
∑
i∈V xi −
∑
i∈A x˜i,ma).
We combine this with the fact that the perturbations re are
independent of inputs x, to get,
fViewA(x)({x˜H, {re}e∈EA}) = fViewA(x′)({x˜H, {re}e∈EA})
∀x, x′ such that, xi = x′i ∀i ∈ A and
∑
i xi =
∑
i x
′
i.
VII. CONCLUSION
We presented TITAN, a finite-time, private algorithm for
solving distributed average consensus. We show that TITAN
converges to the average in finite-time that is dependent
only on graph diameter and number of agents/nodes. It
also protects statistical privacy of inputs against an honest-
but-curious adversary that corrupts at most τ nodes in the
network, provided weak vertex-connectivity of graph is at
least τ +1. We use TITAN to solve a horizontally partitioned
system of linear equations in finite-time, while, protecting
statistical privacy of local equations against an honest-but-
curious adversary.
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